In the last issue of The Economist an article "The banks on methadone" was published.
Its author wrote:
"All these banks are trying to lower the ratio of loans to customer deposits; sounder banks will be rewarded when a new banking levy comes into force next year. Lloyds Banking Group, for example, has a loans-to-deposit ratio of 169%, according to research by Nomura Securities. Barclays and RBS are at 130% and 134%, respectively."
It looks that, at long last, the banks acknowledged that lending with loan to deposit ratio greater than 100% was the cause of the crisis (or at very least that it is a huge problem). This was made clear in "The largest heist in history" written at the end of 2008, immediately after the crisis erupted. However the banks are not going to publicly acknowledged that but are trying quietly do the right thing: reduce this ratio. The snag is that it was not the ratio itself that hit with liquidity crunch but the ridiculously high money multiplier that directly resulted from lending with loan to deposit ratio greater than 100%. High money multiplier means that $1 (or £1, €1, i.e. cash, the legal tender, only real liquidity mean of settling liabilities) has to serve in the system a massive number of dollars (euros, pounds) of banks liabilities ($40, $100, $1,500, anyone's guess could be good as the control was lost by losing control over derivatives and shadow banking markets). This results in banks' assets turing to toxic waste as there is not enough cash in the system going around (due to high money multiplier) to settle the transactions.
Here is a banks' quagmire: continued any lending by banks even with a very low loan to deposit ratio (like 5% or 10%) still increases money multiplier (albeit at much slower rate), therefore exacerbating banks' liquidity position further. So the banks should not really lend at all. But if they do not lend at all the entire system would grind to a halt and the economy would collapse (most likely banks would not get any more of repayment of the loans). So we have a classic: "damn if you do, damn if you don't". So there is little wonder that the banks took all the money from the government but did not start lending again. If the politicians had a bit of intelligence (and basic knowledge of finance) they would have known it. They could not have expected banks to "repair" their balance sheets and lend money at the same time. These two things are contradictory. The point is that there are only two ways of reducing high money multiplier: inflate your way out (print money) or write off banks liabilities (or their combination). Both are not socially and politically acceptable (but a gradual inflating out is already happening).
The writer in The Economist continued:
"But the banks may be wrong to think that squeezing loans will improve these ratios; the Bank of England warned in June that growth in lending is usually the main driver of higher deposits."
It is a mathematical fact that if you stop lending and your loans come back as deposits (which are not re-lent), the ratios would be improved from above 100% to below 100%. However, on practical level the economy, as we know it, would be killed in this process as the money stopped circulating. If you lend less out of your deposits, your loan to deposit ratio will go down (however you may still struggle with high money multiplier). Higher lending indeed drives higher deposits, as the writer in The Economist said, but in absolute terms. This is false in terms for ratios: higher lending drives the loan to deposit ratio higher. This is a mathematical fact. The Economist writer does not understand the basics and confuses a relative figure of loan to deposit ratio with absolute figure of deposits. It is quite amusing to watch the banks doing the right things quietly (so they are not accused of not doing so in the first instance) whilst being lambasted by The Economist for doing these right things.
The paragraph cited in two bits above from The Economist epitomises what went wrong with the banking system (lending with too high loan to deposit ratios) and that mainstream commentators do not have a basic understanding of the mechanism how it works. Even nearly two years later. Although banks got round to it eventually: but it looks that it will be too little and too late and, of course, they will not acknowledge that they were effectively peddling and Albanian-type pyramid scam.
Its author wrote:
"All these banks are trying to lower the ratio of loans to customer deposits; sounder banks will be rewarded when a new banking levy comes into force next year. Lloyds Banking Group, for example, has a loans-to-deposit ratio of 169%, according to research by Nomura Securities. Barclays and RBS are at 130% and 134%, respectively."
It looks that, at long last, the banks acknowledged that lending with loan to deposit ratio greater than 100% was the cause of the crisis (or at very least that it is a huge problem). This was made clear in "The largest heist in history" written at the end of 2008, immediately after the crisis erupted. However the banks are not going to publicly acknowledged that but are trying quietly do the right thing: reduce this ratio. The snag is that it was not the ratio itself that hit with liquidity crunch but the ridiculously high money multiplier that directly resulted from lending with loan to deposit ratio greater than 100%. High money multiplier means that $1 (or £1, €1, i.e. cash, the legal tender, only real liquidity mean of settling liabilities) has to serve in the system a massive number of dollars (euros, pounds) of banks liabilities ($40, $100, $1,500, anyone's guess could be good as the control was lost by losing control over derivatives and shadow banking markets). This results in banks' assets turing to toxic waste as there is not enough cash in the system going around (due to high money multiplier) to settle the transactions.
Here is a banks' quagmire: continued any lending by banks even with a very low loan to deposit ratio (like 5% or 10%) still increases money multiplier (albeit at much slower rate), therefore exacerbating banks' liquidity position further. So the banks should not really lend at all. But if they do not lend at all the entire system would grind to a halt and the economy would collapse (most likely banks would not get any more of repayment of the loans). So we have a classic: "damn if you do, damn if you don't". So there is little wonder that the banks took all the money from the government but did not start lending again. If the politicians had a bit of intelligence (and basic knowledge of finance) they would have known it. They could not have expected banks to "repair" their balance sheets and lend money at the same time. These two things are contradictory. The point is that there are only two ways of reducing high money multiplier: inflate your way out (print money) or write off banks liabilities (or their combination). Both are not socially and politically acceptable (but a gradual inflating out is already happening).
The writer in The Economist continued:
"But the banks may be wrong to think that squeezing loans will improve these ratios; the Bank of England warned in June that growth in lending is usually the main driver of higher deposits."
It is a mathematical fact that if you stop lending and your loans come back as deposits (which are not re-lent), the ratios would be improved from above 100% to below 100%. However, on practical level the economy, as we know it, would be killed in this process as the money stopped circulating. If you lend less out of your deposits, your loan to deposit ratio will go down (however you may still struggle with high money multiplier). Higher lending indeed drives higher deposits, as the writer in The Economist said, but in absolute terms. This is false in terms for ratios: higher lending drives the loan to deposit ratio higher. This is a mathematical fact. The Economist writer does not understand the basics and confuses a relative figure of loan to deposit ratio with absolute figure of deposits. It is quite amusing to watch the banks doing the right things quietly (so they are not accused of not doing so in the first instance) whilst being lambasted by The Economist for doing these right things.
The paragraph cited in two bits above from The Economist epitomises what went wrong with the banking system (lending with too high loan to deposit ratios) and that mainstream commentators do not have a basic understanding of the mechanism how it works. Even nearly two years later. Although banks got round to it eventually: but it looks that it will be too little and too late and, of course, they will not acknowledge that they were effectively peddling and Albanian-type pyramid scam.